Inequality and Coalitions Size Essay -- American History, Revenues

The interrelations of social segregation and Inequality have been largely studied by several authors (Fernndez y Rogerson, 1996 y 1997 Bnabou 1996a y 1996b Gravel y Thoron, 2007 Durlauf, 1996). Nevertheless, the majority of these studies have concentrated in demonstrating the possibility of a segregated equilibrium. This last is understood as the formation of consecutive clubs, ordered in accordance with a variable that represents the social position of the economic agents. In the majority of the studies, this variable is the wealth of the persons or his human capital. The problem with this sort of moulds is that they do not study the effect of the income distribution over the spirit level of segregation. As a result, they cant answer questions like the succeeding(a) the size of the coalitions decrease with the degree of wealth inequality? In a society, the size of the coalitions formed by wealthy agents are bigger than the coalition of the vile ones? This is an important weakness of this type of literature. In effect, the collective interrelation inside coalitions can determine the accumulation of social capital and human capital, and it is well-known that the two are essentials factors in economic development (Benabou, 1996a Glomm y Ravikumar, 1992 Fernndez y Rogerson, 1996 Durlauf, 1996) Some authors as Bnabou (1996th) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) compare the economic and distributive outcomes of integrated versus segregated societies. That kind of analysis is relevant to analyze problems such as the benefits and cost of public versus private education. Nevertheless, it is not very useful in analysing other problems as the determinants and the consequences of kind segregation. In this paper, we study t... ...artition. Jehiel and Scotchmer (1997 and 2001) characterise the free mobility equilibrium. However, they do not introduce heterogeneity in the distribution of wealth, and they suppose a very unrealistic proceeds function (linea r). Moreover, their distribution of characteristics of agents is very narrow (uniform). Finally, they have not made the comparative static exercises required to understand the relationship between the heterogeneity of the agents and the degree of social segregation. Most of the models that demonstrate the existence of a consecutive core equilibrium, use super additive and cooperative games. (Greenber y Weber, 1986 Demange, 1982 y 1994). However, this kind of model have two defects. First, although they demonstrate the existence of a consecutive equilibrium, they do not analyze the effect of inequality on the size of coalitions.